Introduction
This article is based on research concerning the relationship between the neo-liberal project in Nev.' Zealand and the mass media since 1984 . .
1
Ne\V Zealand has undoubtedly experienced a major shift in public policy orientation in correspondence with structural changes in the political economy. The assumed role of government under social democratic Keynesianism was questioned and restructuring of the state became central to the neo-liberal project. The resultant policies reorganised economic, political and social priorities were rapidly implemented and had a detrimental impact upon ,,arious sectors of society. Consequently, such policies had to be rationalised and strategically promoted in order to marginalise opposition and allay public scepticism.
2
As neo-liberalism was being transmitted to the public, New Zealand's me.dia system was undergoing changes in ter1ns of the surrounding economic environment and media-government relationships. Such circumstances enabled both the fourth Labour Government and the succeeding National administration to routinely c.ommunicate their messages. This claim required illustration. To this end I undertook research on the debate conducted in and through the media over the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act (1991).
The purpose of this article is to consider the differential symbolic resources available to capital and labour in periods of major industrial relations controversy. The power to define and impose an understanding of issues and events is held, not surprisingly, by the economically powerful groups in society. Nevertheless, it is more straightforward to control the circulation of wealth than the circulation of meaning. It is true that material and symbolic resources are not equally available to all political actors/groups, but the possession of such resources does not necessarily predetertiline their ability to secure dominant interpretations of the "real". When an issue is placed on the political agenda, groups mobilise and commence the battle for symbolic dominance; that is, part of the battle involv, es gaining access to the media, "'to the systems of infortnation production and distribution" (Schlesinger, 1990: 82) . During the period in which the issue is debated, there is a dynamic interaction among groups and between groups and the m, edia. Within each group, strategies are devised and revised to monitor opponents and media representations of the issue. .
How, ever, the rules of the game are not impartial, certain political actors and vested interests, by virtue of their institutional status and financial resources, assume legitimacy and authoritativeness within the media domain. In the case of the ECA debate, other critical variables shaped m, edia coverage of the policy path: the government's communication strategy; the degree of elite consensus; the defects of New Zealand's media; and the ideological coherence of the pro ECA debate.
In what follows I will, first, outline the structural inequality between capital and labour in tern1s of interest articulation. This is important because it explains the uneven resources available to capital and labour in their struggle for symbolic dominance. Second, I will explain the nature of news production, together with shifts in the , economic and political environment of media organisations. In light of these aspects, I will summarise the fmdings of the media coverage of the ECA debate.
3
All items on the Employment Contracts Act on prime time television news on TV I and TV3, together with current affairs programmes, and in th, e four metropolitan daily newspapers -the New Zealand Herald, the Dominion, the Christchur, ch Press, the Otago Daily Times. Broadcast items on National Radio and articles in magazines were occasionally perused. --market will always be dependent upon capital's willingness to employ. Offe identifies this as a relationship of "asymmetrical dependence". Workers have an inherent interest in the profitability of employers' enterprises, but employers are not as compelled to consider the well-being of workers. Unions, moreover, are less able to secure external institutional support for their actions. By contrast, business associations are uniquely placed to lobby government leaders and to exert indirect control over public policy, because the state relies upon the profitability of capital.
7
This is an important point when considering the Employment Contracts Act. Fractions of capital were lobbying the two major political parties for labour market deregulation from the mid 1980s. Offe's analysis functions as an explicit rejection of the pluralist assumption that interest groups compete on a level playing field for political influence and that the state, as independent adjudicator, pays equal attention to each and every group. Offe's approach suggests that capital exercises political and economic power from a position of structural dominance. From here, it is important to idẽntify aspects of the media system which effectively promote ruling interests.
The media dimension
The role of the media contributing to the political outcomes of industrial relations struggles, has received insufficient critical analysis.
9
The modern mass media have assumed the capacity to communicate political agendas over and above traditional intertnediary institutions such as political parties, interest groups, families and schools. News organisations, especially television, have becomẽ a vital source of political knowledge and inforn1ation for the citizenry. This is especially the case when the issue at stake lies outside the interpersonal world. Thus, in the case of political struggles over industrial relations, the question of what gets communicated is vitally important. The problems, causes, and solutions which are politicised can set parameters of debate. Consequently, certain interpretations of the issue are favoured over others and only some courses of action appear plausible.
I
The news is a manufactured product which is shaped by the routine practices of journalism, the characteristics and structure of media organisations and all those institutions, groups and individuals with an interest in the communication of political inforrnation. Furthetnlorẽ, mediated inforn1ation is generated in the context of wider economic, ideological, and social processes. Hall and others, in an early study of news production, constructed the "primary 7 8 9 "The dependency of the state apparatus upon the perfonnance of capital . . . is unparalleled by a reciprocal dependency relationship of the capitalist class upon the state. This structural asymmetry is exploited and fine-tuned by the operation of business associations, but it is by no means constituted or created by them. Their success is not accomplished by or because of the organisation itself; rather, it derives from a powẽr relationship that is logically and historically prior to the fact of any collective action of businessmen" (Offe, 1985: 192) .
Proponents of a deregulated labour market aimed to increase labour market flexibility by removing the legal and institutional "barriers" which enhanced to a degree the ability of unions to generally represent the interests of workers and negotiate the tenns and conditions of employment.
For British research see Glasgow Univers. ity Media Group ( 1976 Group ( , 1980 The finance sector expanded to service such large-scale it too required sophisticated commtJnications systems. More late 1960s the search for increased levels of productivity and profits, be solely extracted from traditional manufacturing and heavy industry II t11at of the story, which contains a beginning, middle and end, highlighting notes: "The story fonnat favours resolution over doubt, the concrete of recent, finite events over the analytical account of sectors, led to a growth in the "information" sector. The rapid development in communications technologies provided new inforn1ation goods and services for exchange in new markets with the prospect of new growth (Garnham, 1990: 117) . Technological innovation in the field of communications removed, to a large degree, the limits to the size and expansion of transnational corporations. The speed with which such corporations can access inforrnation and co-ordinate commercial activities greatly enhanced their economic influence (Deetz, 1992: 209) .
The operational freedom of such corporations has been enhanced by the policy actions of individual nation states. To varying degrees, the initiatives of governments worldwide over the last decade have been geared towards privatisation. This has variously involved the corporatisation of the public sector, the privatisation of state assets and the deregulation of the environment within which corporate activity occurs in te1n1s of laws governing the nature of ownership and control (Murdock, 1990: 10-14) . The extent to which individual nations placed political-legal limitations upon conglomerates detern1ined the structure of domestic media operations. In a recent comparative study, Cocker argues that the extension of the free market ethos into the broadcasting arena was more complete in New Zealand than ẽlsewhere (Cocker, 1992: 12) . The deregulation of broadcasting and the removal of legal restrictions governing merger and takeover activity from the late 1980s have impacted upon political discourse. Commercialisation of the media industry has resulted in staffing and resource cuts forcing news and current affairs programmes to rely on pre-packaged material from official sources and news agencies. Consequently, news media products are forttlularised across all mainstream outlets. The drive to maximise audiences for advertisers restricted the extent to which certain topics of public interest could be covered. Increasingly, the media disseminated infotainment rather than public affairs journalism. In this regard, style becomes valued over substance, and personalities prevail over policy. Little room is left for in-depth analysis of political matters.
The relations between media and govẽrnment have also shifted over the last 15 years. First, gQvernments have pressured the media to circulate particular political ideas and inforn1ation. Official restrictions on the freedom of the press and broadcasting are part of Nẽw Zealand's history. This continues in various old and new forrns: friendly and infottnal meetings with journalists, briefings to broadcasting executives and legal intimidation (Scott, 1995: 54-61 ) . Secondly, governn1ents have built up their own publicity and press relations activities. 11 Under the fourth Labour Government, infortnation managem, ent and public relations became an intrinsic part of the political process. The "media machines" built up around governments provide media organisations with a steady stream of ready-made stories to suit both news formats and public consumption. Press secretaries and media minders write speeches, act as gatekeepers between journalists and politicians, manage press conferences ap.d mastern1ind • .,....
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Jane Scott
To encourage the formation of industrial relations and associations, (Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894).
To promote an efficient labour market, (Employment Contracts Act 1991 ).
That such a radical overhaul of industrial relations could be initiated in 1990 is due to a number of factors, some of which relate to the material resources available to labour and capital. First, the structural changes of the previous six years had not only wẽakened the union movement, but also removed its peak organisation from the consultative process. The rejection of semi-fortnalised corporatist principles meant that there was no place for the union movement in wider political and economic discussions.
Second, although the fourth Labour Government had not followed through with labour market deregulation, it had dismantled the kind of macro-economic regime necessary for any corporatist-style arrangements. There wẽre, in effect, no regulatory impediments to National's radical industrial relations programmẽ. All that remained was thẽ existing industrial relations law. To strongly oppose the Employment Contracts Act, the Labour Opposition would have had to deny the efficacy of its own ẽconomic "restructuring".
Third, the key economic advisers to government, the Treasury and the Reserve Bank, were ardent promoters of the neo-liberal project and a "'free (labour) market". Treasury had not succeeded in its detertnination to deregulate the labour market during Labour's tertns in office, but, throughout the 1980s, it had devẽloped its proposals to present to the incoming, traditionally anti-union National Government. Also during this period, the Business Roundtable, which had become a key government lobbyist, advocated the kinds of changes to industrial relations which inforrned the Employment Contracts Act. It was soon joined by the Employers' Federation. National had been studying its industrial relations policy in liaison with these groups and was prẽparing to make it a key election issue in 1990. Proponents of a deregulated labour market had thus been developing proposals for some time and the re-arranged interest group system (whereby trade unions and other groups had been marginalised as "vested interests") assisted their promotional work (Scott, 1995: 80-93) .
Fourth, the ideological climate was conducive to the proposal for a deregulated labour market. The neo-liberal proJect was infortned by economic theories which understood the economy to operate in a self-regulating manner. There was no need for state intervention. Indeed, regulatory mẽasures inhibited the free play of market forces, producing sub-optimal outcomes. At the end of 1990, the political terrain upon which policy discussion took place had shifted to the right. National's attacks on the trade union movement and collective bargaining principles were bolstered by the already assembled frames for neo-liberal discussion. A plausible case could be made for the Employment Contracts Act in terms of the individual rights of workers and the incompetency of the state in regulating the (labour) market. Dissolving union structures could be cited as a panacea for the low growth and high unemployment of 1990/1991. Thus, the union movement confronted the rightward shifting political terrain within a rearranged interest group system. Its inability to widen frames for debate had a direct impact on news coverage. • Secondly, while the news media do respond to political controversy, significant political players must be willing or able to generate it. However, unlike the benefit cuts, the National caucus was undivided over employment contracts and the Labour Opposition was virtually non-existent. A principled stand against welfare cuts was unlikely to alienate electoral support, but Labour appeared less inclined to stir up popular anti-union sentiment by committing itself against the proposed legislation. The pro-union New Labour Party, with fledgling voter support, was not accorded media attention as a credible political party. As the Bill's major opponent, the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) was uncertain of the appropriate opposition strategy. The CTU's political and industrial resources had been damaged by declining membership and funds throughout the 1980s, and by 1990-1991 rising unemployment worsened its position further. The CTU had little influence over a neo-liberal project which had been introduced by its traditional ally, the Labour Party. After National's November election victory, it was no longer a player in policy debate and this affected the CTU's credibility as an authoritative news source. Although there was not unanimous employer support for the draft legislation, the media responded to positive pronouncements by the major groupings -the Business Roundtable, the Employers Federation and, occasionally, regional employers' associations.
Thirdly, the Employment Contracts Bill faced stiff competition for news coverage. From mid December 1990 through to February 1991, the Gulf War dominated the print and broadcast media. On the domestic front, in the company of the controversial welfare cuts, the Employment Contracts Bill appeared relatively staid and uninteresting.
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Industrial relations may be an issu, e familiar and relevant to the public, but awareness of the complexities and origins of the proposed changes were uneven. The typical five second television sound bite interview with passers-by may not have elicited any response.
11
Knowledge of the issue would have been restricted to a few key players, namely the unions and employers' associations. Moreover, the main target of the refottns -the unions -were assumed to be collectively powerful and this ruled them out of populist news frames.
18
In any event, the proposed changes were highly technical (although the general principles were straightforward) and few journalists have specialist knowledge in the field of industrial relations. Moreover, according to one journalist interviewed, they would not have been encouraged to write 16 17 18 S· ince the deregulation of broadcasting, commentators have noted the shift from public affairs journalism to "infotainment". In order to attract the largest possible audience, to attract advertising revenue, topics of , entertainm· ent value predominate (Atkinson, 1994; Edwards, 1992) .
Atkinson identifies the shift in television news towards "personalised story-telling ... elite interviews have been largely displaced by interviews with ordinary people on the street, supermarket or other easily accessible location". This is acknowledged by Television New Zealand, which sees the shift as "a worthwhile contribution to an infonned democracy", to which Atkinson responds "allowing ordinary people to , express helpless outrage in vanishingly brief interviews, can scarcely be said to 'empower' them", (Atkinson, 1994: 162-163 ).
Atkinson' s , content analysis of television news reveals the increase of human interest stories and "more emotionally coloured, victim-orientated portrayals of crime, accidents and natural disasters" (Atkinson, 1994 : 162) . Unions wer, e not understood to be in the category of "victim". When political issues are cover, ed, they are predominately constructed in personalised tenns -the plight of a beneficiary, one family's fight with an individual hospital or the ACC. The Employment Contracts Act was difficult to represent in these tenns. This, too, drew attention away flom 1he policy and the as its agent. As a legitimated source, the gover1•ment's actions aad · are centaal to news coverage. The pattern of coverage, which defined the protest events as news rather the political issue which motivated them, enabled the government to respond to the pro1ests and not the issue. It was, for a time, stlaightforward for the gove11•ment to feed into the news flames of the protest action. The protestors were ir1ational for they had been misled by •mion propaganda. If the opposition movement was simply mistaken in its criticis•n of the policy, then the gover••ment was justified in ignoring it. This position was reported in the media and undern1ined the protest action as inauspicious and ineffective. The latter was accentuated by the media's standard attention to the routine legislative process-bills simply become law.
Indeed, the most salient point communicated was the (inevitable) passage of the legislation. And the dominant news frame represented the introduction of the Bill as an event without a 24
26
The 3NN (4 April 1991) graphic displayed a blackboard in which was scribbled "No clas9e5 today". Considerable space was devoted to what the pupils got up to on their "unscheduled holiday": "music stores did a roaring trade, so did other traditional teenage haunts like burger bars and video parlours". The accompanying film clips poi trayed central Auckland as being over-run with loitering teenagers -an outcome of the "anti-government" behaviour of their teachers. ONN focused upon a forlorn schoolboy sitting on an empty bus and on the "parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts and friends (who) were left to mind the children for a day". Both channels sent out reporters to burger ban and video parlours to obtain the children's response to their teachers' activity. JNN, in particular, gave extended coverage to their idiosyncratic responses.
On 4 April 1991, JNN, the reporter announced that "today's demonstrations and strikes don't appear to have changed the government's mind". Lockwood Smith asserted: "They've sent me a statement with four reasons why they're on strike ... three of them aren't valid and one of them relates to union power and I do acknowledge that. The Bill will affect union power". Bill Birch announced: "I think the teachers have been misled by the unions, yes, I think there is overwhelming evidence that the infonnation that the unions have put in front of teachers and a large number of other people has grossly misled them".
Prior to the protest action, on 1 April 1991, the 3NN item was solely about disruption: "Schools and hospitals will be the hardest hit as union members walk off the job ... schools and hospitals will be disrupted" and on 3 April 1991: "It's likely most schools will be closed by strike action ... these children and hundreds of thousands more wi II not be taught tom on ow". ONN announced that "hospitals were drained of medical personnel for two hours while skeleton crew took over. Management was prepared for the strike. Auckland Hospital stopped admitting patients six days ago. Routine operations were put on hold". Newspaper headlines followed suit: "Week of action to hit many sectors", NZH,news, there were no perspectives sought fiom expet ts, individual employers or iDdividual uoious daily newspapers provided matter of fact accounts _,., parliamentary process and political reactions. These policy implementation and govanment-CTU jibes. As the and the CTU deepened towards the end of March 1991, PJ811 on the theme of battle and political tactics.
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However, introduced a wider range of voices: individual employers aal domestic and overseas expel ts
•
Continued opposition to the Employment Contracts Act bad prompted media ~ generated new themes. The policy became depicted more as an object of Television finally devoted studio interview and CUI'ICDt
• slots to the illlle and these signalled tbat there were two opposing versions of the legislation. 33 a 1111111
of contentious issues were raised, the general supposition was that the effects of the poliaJ could not be established. This assisted supporters who were deterauined to diacredit the pall and hold out a promising future under the new industrial relations system. Overall, the clebail was not sufficiently explored. There was a tendency to personalise the issues and to favour the mainsbeam (govetnment) perspective. While independent experts were interviewed, they were not invited to debate the policy. Studio debates were clearly understood by television's producers to provide more entertainment if they were set up between political antagonists. 
40
The proposals for the abolition of specialist labour institutions, favomul by the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation, had been rejected. Thus, some of the concerns expressed by unions, workers and some media commentators were laid to resL However, a strong case can be made that the government's concessions were minimal. National had never intended the policy's principles to be fundamentally challenged dwing the select committee review. The resulting concessions were those which the government, from the outset, had deemed open to debate: specialist labour institutions and personal grievance procedures.
41
The oveiiiding media sense of a "fair compromise" 42 undermined any real purpose for the fmal Day of Action on 30 April. News coverage presented a resigned crowd and a disinterested Minister of Labour. News frames of the action replicated those earlier in the month: disruption, frivolity, emotionalism, ineffectuality.
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It seemed that in communicating images of opposition to the Employment Contracts Act; the media had deployed a "business as usual" frame. This included conflict and its resolution through established procedures. The "compromise" frame was in place and the Bill was seen to be proceeding naturally 37 31 39 40 41 "Bill will be changed says Peters", NZH, 9 April 1991, p.3. Max Bradford was quoted as saying that "the very heart of the Bill could be reviewed"; "Bradford signals possible changes to Bill", ODT, II April 1991, p.l; "Controversial bill may be modified", NZH, II April 1991, p.l. The Press noted that "substantial changes to the ECB will be recommended by Parliament's labour select committee"-"Bargaining compulsion likely in Bill changes", Press, II April 1991, p.3. On 13 April 1991, 3NN announced that had been a "breakthrough over Employment Contracts". Bill Birch announced that the submissions to the select committee "made a bigger impression" than mass protests which were "a very crude instrument and the Government would not take much notice of them". The Bill would undergo change on the basis that "several issues had been identified by the select committee", "Birch brushes off protests against the bill", ODT, 6 April 1991 , p.4. "No general strike call", Press, 11 April 1991 "Strike opposed", NZH, 17 April 1991, p.3 ; "Douglas rejects general strike", Dominion, 17 April 1991, p.7; "CTU to assess progress", Press, 18 April 1991, p.8; "General Strike: unions to meet", NZH, 18 April 1991, p.2; "CTU meets to argue general strike call", Dominion, 18 April 1991, p.ll.
JNN briefly announced that the CTU had "stopped short of calling for a general strike". The media were singularly unimpressed with the alternative "day of action" proposed, this was pronounced to be "a sort of Clayton's strike".
ONN refe1 1 ed to the ECB as "revamped" and having undergone "a significant rewrite". ONN announced that the Bill returned to parliament "with most of its contentious provisions intact", but these were said to relate to voluntary unionism.
See Walsh (1993).
"Amended bill strikes balance",NZH, 23 Aprill991, p.l; "Changes to bill easeconcerns",NZH, 22 April 1991, p.3; "Balanced contracts bill returns", ODT, 23 April 1991, p.4. ONN and JNN, 29 and 30 April 1991 . The Day of Action on 30 April received minimal coverage in the daily newspapers with reports highlighting the entertainment provided at the rallies and Birch's disinterest. IIIIa nntioa to the situation. The Do111lnion editorial, "Trouble on the p.12, announced that the public would be well disposed toward the Employment elllerved "the dying twitches of the old industrial relations era". Opposition to the ECA was both communicated and contained. This does not mean that the . Political controversy is totally submerged. Considerable efforts are required on the part of oppositional groups, however, to contest and counter-define the parameters of argument. Such efforts both shape and depend upon changes to the political, economic and ideological environment of industrial relations, which in turn deterntine the distribution of material and symbolic resources.
